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Abstract
The power sector reforms that commenced in the
1990s led to the establishment of independent elec-
tricity regulators in more than twenty countries
across Africa. The main purpose for these institu-
tions was to create greater transparency in tariff set-
ting and provide increased certainty for investors. At
the same time regulators are charged with the pro-
tection of the interests of current and future con-
sumers of electricity. During the initial stages of
reform it was the expectation that the state owned
incumbents that were traditionally vertically inte-
grated would be unbundled and privatised. In prac-
tice there have been very few privatisations and
what have emerged are hybrid markets where state-
owned utilities remain dominant with independent
power producers on the margin. In these markets
regulation is a complex melting pot of incentivising
the performance of state-owned utilities, attraction
of private sector investment especially to fill gaps in
generation capacity and making sensitive pricing
decisions. Recognising that regulation is beginning
to establish a track record, the African Electricity
Regulator Peer Review and Learning Network, an
initiative of the University of Cape Town, Graduate
School of Business provides an opportunity for high
level learning through the assessment of regulatory
performance. We detail an assessment of regulation
in Namibia where we find prices transitioning to cost
reflectivity but question the sustainability of current
arrangements in the distribution of electricity and
the country’s long-term generation adequacy.
Keywords: regulatory performance, regulatory
impact, regulatory governance, regulatory sub-
stance, peer reviews, experiential learning
1. Introduction
1.1 The peer learning network
This paper draws on the work of the African
Electricity Regulator Peer Review and Learning
Network (Peer Learning Network), an initiative co-
ordinated by the Management Programme in
Infrastructure Reform and Regulation (MIR) at the
University of Cape Town’s (UCT) Graduate School
of Business (GSB).
The Network comprises the Chief Executive
Officers of the electricity regulators in Ghana,
Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia
(the members) who assess regulatory performance
in each others’ countries. This is done through
structured and comprehensive peer reviews that
also provide opportunities for deep experiential
learning by the network members. It is expected
that the lessons learnt will enhance leadership and
management capability amongst senior regulators
in Africa, and lead to increased credibility, legitima-
cy, transparency and robustness in their decisions.
The first peer review was conducted in
Windhoek, Namibia from 20 to 24 October 2008
and is the subject of this paper.
1.2 Approach
Over a one week period, five of the members of the
Peer Learning Network evaluate, on site, the regu-
latory system in the country of the sixth member.
Interviews are undertaken with all relevant stake-
holders ranging from the responsible minister, regu-
latory commissioners (board members), utilities,
investors, consumer groups, non-governmental
organisations and journalists. During the interviews,
the stakeholders are invited to give their views on
their experience with and performance of the elec-
tricity regulator and the electricity sector as a whole.
This is followed by in-depth interrogation of regula-
tor staff on the processes and outcomes of regulato-
ry decisions.
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The method of evaluation is adapted from
Brown, Stern, et al.(2006) where the regulatory sys-
tem is defined as ‘the combination of institutions,
laws, and processes that give government control
over the operating and investment decisions of
enterprises that supply infrastructure services.’
Brown, Stern et al., (2006) observe that: ‘any regu-
latory system has two important dimensions: regu-
latory governance and regulatory substance.’
Regulatory governance, also referred to as the
‘how’ of regulation, is ‘defined by the laws, process-
es, and procedures that determine the enterprises,
actions, and parameters that are regulated, the gov-
ernment entities that make the regulatory decisions,
and the resources and information that are avail-
able to them’ (Stern, 2009). 
Regulatory substance is the ‘what’, or content,
of regulation referring to core regulatory actions and
decisions in relation to licensing (i.e. market access),
tariff setting and supply and service and standards.
The desired outcome of the interaction between
regulatory governance and regulatory substance,
regulatory impact, can be distilled into four main
themes: cost effective pricing; reliable and quality
infrastructure (electricity) service; sector financial
and economic viability; and the timely attraction of
new investment. Based on the foregoing, the regu-
latory system can be depicted as shown in Figure 1.
2.  A framework for assessing regulatory
performance
2.1 Regulatory impact
Effective regulatory systems create a more pre-
dictable and less risky environment for private
investment and ‘is a means to an end’ (Stern &
Holder 1999). That end should be seen in the con-
text of regulatory impact.
As shown in Figure 1, regulatory impact is influ-
enced by the regulatory governance arrangements
and the content of regulation (regulatory sub-
stance). Consistent with the desired outcomes of
regulation enumerated in Section 1.2 i.e. cost-effec-
tive pricing, reliable and quality infrastructure serv-
ice, financially viable utilities and the attraction of
new investment, Stern (2009) observes that the
‘key objective of economic regulation of infrastruc-
ture industries is to ensure the continuous supply,
over the long-term, of unspecified infrastructure
services of defined quality at the minimum neces-
sary cost (and prices) to the population and indus-
try of the country.’ It is within this context that reg-
ulatory performance should be evaluated.
2.2 Regulatory performance
The determination of regulatory performance is
however not a simple undertaking. As Brown, Stern
et al (2006) state, ‘it is virtually impossible in a sin-
gle-country case study to calculate the separate
effect of a new regulatory system on overall sector
performance.’ This difficulty arises from the fact
that regulatory reform tends to be part of a wider
package of measures that may include restructuring,
commercialisation, private sector participation etc.
Faced with this limitation, our approach to under-
standing regulatory performance is two-fold; firstly,
we gather data based on the desired sector out-
comes and secondly, an interrogation of whether
the specific elements of regulatory governance and
regulatory substance in Namibia help or hinder sec-
tor performance is made.
2.3 Regulatory governance
Regulatory governance is ‘the institutional and legal
design of the regulatory system and is the frame-
work in which decisions are made’ (Brown, Stern et
al,. 2006). Newberry (1977) presents the regulato-
ry problem as the need to ‘agree a regulatory com-
pact which assures investors that their sunk capital
will be adequately rewarded, and they will be pro-
tected from populist pressure to reduce prices to
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Figure 1: The regulatory system
avoidable cost.’ Such a regulatory compact should
create more certainty and in effect reduce the
amount of decision-making discretion available to
the regulator, i.e. it should reduce arbitrary deci-
sion-making. Levy and Spiller (1994) define regula-
tory governance as being ‘the mechanisms that
societies use to constrain regulatory discretion and
to resolve conflicts that arise in relation to these
constraints’. They further state that performance (in
the sense of sustaining private sector investment)
can be satisfactory, provided three complimentary
mechanisms restraining arbitrary administrative
action are in place, namely: ‘(a) substantive
restraints on the discretion of the regulator, (b) for-
mal or informal constraints on changing the regula-
tory system, and (c) institutions that enforce the
above formal-substantive or procedural-con-
straints’. This might imply that full regulatory com-
mitment is exhibited through regulators having no
discretion. But as Stern and Cubbin (2005)
observe: ‘in practice, it is virtually impossible for
regulatory agencies to avoid interpretation of their
objectives and to avoid discretion. The issue is then
how to establish governance procedures that allow
for the inevitability and desirability of a non-trivial
degree of bounded and accountable discretion.’ To
achieve this, Stern and Holder (1999) contend that
governance arrangements should be such that they
ensure transparency and predictability, two attrib-
utes that are anchored on accountability. They pres-
ent accountability as comprising two aspects; for-
mal and informal. Formal accountability refers to
the formal legal basis in which the regulator oper-
ates, effectively in the tradition of the call for
restraint presented by Levy and Spiller (1944)
whereas informal accountability is the degree to
which the regulatory process ‘encourages debate
and open discussion; involves all relevant parties;
leads to justification by the regulator of decisions
and methodologies; and generally leads to a clear
understanding of the “rules of the game”’ (Stern,
1977).
From the foregoing regulatory governance can
be depicted as shown in Figure 2 which provides
the basis for the Peer Learning Network’s evalua-
tion of this dimension of the regulatory system.
2.4 Regulatory substance
Brown, Stern et al. (2006) define regulatory sub-
stance as the content of regulation, the actual deci-
sions, whether explicit or implicit, made by the reg-
ulatory entity. The network and natural monopoly
characteristics of many infrastructure industries,
such as electricity transmission and distribution,
mean that economic rent may be extracted by oper-
ators at the expense of consumers, and that eco-
nomic regulation is necessary. There is a large body
of literature on economic regulation and tariff set-
ting. It is not intended that a review of various pric-
ing methodologies is made here, suffice to state that
regulators have various well tested means at their
disposal to determine tariff levels and tariff struc-
tures. 
Regulatory substance is primarily about pricing
decisions. It is also about determining market
access, through licences. A further dimension is the
development and enforcement of technical and
commercial quality standards, and resolution of dis-
putes between utility and consumer and amongst
utilities. Other substantive issues that are of special
importance in Africa are pro-poor measures that
facilitate access to, and affordability of, electricity
services. Figure 3 depicts regulatory substance.
3. The Namibian electricity industry
3.1 Policy and regulation
Policy direction for the Namibian electricity industry
is provided by the Ministry of Mines and Energy.
Following the enactment of the Electricity Act in
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Figure 2: Regulatory governance
2000, an independent regulator for the industry, the
Electricity Control Board (ECB), was established. In
2007 the Electricity Act was amended, making pro-
vision for private participation in the sector.
3.2 Industry structure
At the time of the peer review the structure of the
Namibian electricity industry was in transition and
is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Existing structure of Namibia
electricity industry
Matters that remain outstanding with respect to
the structure include the location of the single –
buyer function, currently retained de facto by
NamPower, and its roles, obligations and gover-
nance structure, particularly as they relate to the
need to assure prospective Independent Power
Producer (IPP) investors of a ‘level playing field’. In
addition, whether IPPs should exclusively trade with
the single – buyer, or have bilateral access to local
and international parties, has been a matter of
debate. 
In distribution, the formation of two REDs one
covering the area served by the Windhoek
Municipality, the other in the south of the country,
remains outstanding. The proliferation of municipal
authorities that are to be augmented in the forma-
tion of the two outstanding REDs coupled with the
problematic local authority surcharge present size-
able challenges in reaching the expected end state
structure of the industry.
4 Understanding regulatory performance
in Namibia
4.1 Key regulatory issues
The Namibian ESI faces four main regulatory
issues. Firstly, as is the case in the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa (Eberhard, Foster et al., 2008), end-
use electricity tariffs do not reflect the full cost of
generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Secondly, access to electricity is low. 2001 figures
show that while for urban areas access was an envi-
able 67.6%1 (less than a quarter of households in
sub-Saharan Africa have access), rural access
remained at a low 9.5% resulting in an overall
country access rate of 32%. Thirdly, peak demand
at 533 MW2 (which had grown at an annual aver-
age rate of 5.3% over the period 1998 – 2008,
Figure 5); outstrips the country’s installed capacity
of 393 MW and is forecast to almost double over
the next ten years (NamPower, 2009). This has led
to Namibia being increasingly dependent on elec-
tricity imports from its neighbours in the Southern
African region as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 5: Namibia demand and consumption
However, the region as a whole is experiencing
a generation deficit and the Southern African Power
Pool (SAPP) forecasts that this shall be the case until
2013 at the earliest (Southern African Power Pool,
2009). As a result, the Government of Namibia
(GoN) is keen that new indigenous generation
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Figure 3: Regulatory substance
capacity is built. While a pipeline of new generation
projects has existed for some time, none have yet
been realised. The earliest that any new generation
is expected to come on stream is now 2012 when
the fourth 92MW unit at Ruacana Power station
enters commercial operation. The flagship Kudu
gas-to-power project which is crucial for the coun-
try’s goal of self sufficiency in generation has faced
delay and due to conceptual design changes has
now been resized from its initial 800 MW to 500
MW and might only be commissioned in 2014.
Figure 6: Indigenous generation vs imports
The fourth issue is the number of small and non-
viable electricity distributors. For a country with a
population of two million and with an access rate of
32%, it is somewhat surprising that there are 22
entities licensed to distribute electricity. This places
an inordinate amount of required regulatory effort
on the industry regulator, the Electricity Control
Board (ECB). In addition, municipal-owned elec-
tricity distributors electricity are permitted to a dis-
cretionary tax known as the Local Authority
Surcharge (LAS), which adds considerably to the
cost of electricity.
4.2 Regulatory governance
While the mere establishment of an independent
regulatory agency does to some extent signal regu-
latory commitment, the achievement of desired out-
comes is dependent on the design of the regulatory
system. A key finding for Namibia was that
although the Electricity Act was unambiguous in its
allocation of roles and responsibilities, quite a sig-
nificant degree of final decision-making authority
that would ordinarily reside with the regulator had
been retained by the Minister. For example, the
Minister, rather than the regulator, approves
licences and regulations, thus compromising the
independence of the regulator. ECB officials that
were interviewed did however not find these claus-
es to be problematic but rather claimed that the
arrangement gave rise to a degree of political legit-
imacy and had in fact worked well so far. The rea-
son for this appeared to be more on account of per-
sonnel as opposed to the systems in place. For this
reason it was questionable whether this good work-
ing relationship would be sustained over time.
Procedurally it was unclear how the Minister would
make the relevant regulatory decisions and hence
the required degree of bounded and accountable
discretion, referred to in section 2.3, which is
absent. In any case, given that the ECB has final
decision making authority over what is ostensibly
the most contentious of regulatory matters, tariffs, it
was surprising that the remaining regulatory respon-
sibilities had been left to Ministerial discretion.
Formal accountability requires that there is a
mechanism through which regulatory decisions can
be appealed. While parties to an ECB decision had
the inalienable right to approach the courts of law
for judicial review, it was found that there was no
internal procedure that could be used to appeal to
the ECB directly. The regulator had noted this
anomaly and was in the process of developing a
procedure.
Effective regulatory governance should ‘encour-
age debate and open discussion’ (Stern, 1997) as
part of its informal accountability attributes. An
avenue that regulators regularly use to achieve this
is the holding of public hearings on key issues such
as for tariff applications. This was however not the
case in Namibia. Public hearings could lead to
greater public awareness of the regulatory process
and engender a better understanding of regulation
including matters such as the methodologies
employed for tariff setting. The absence of public
hearings in Namibia could in part explain why there
was no organised lobby that, in a sustained manner,
made representations before the regulator on behalf
of general electricity consuming public.
4.3 Regulatory substance
4.3.1 Cost-effective pricing
Namibia’s Energy Policy (1998) sets out the follow-
ing guiding principle for the setting of tariffs:
• Sound economic principles;
• Cost reflectivity (as far as possible);
• Should reflect long run marginal costs of supply;
and
• Grant existing and potential industry partici-
pants a level playing field.
Even though NamPower is a vertically integrated
utility, tariffs for generation, transmission and distri-
bution in Namibia are determined separately. For
generation, the ECB uses an inefficient import par-
ity pricing (IPP) regime that prices local generation
at the cost of imported electricity. The rationale for
this is the country’s high dependence on electricity
imports especially from South Africa. However, the
effect of this regime is to excessively reward the low
cost to the Ruacana hydro plant. The regulator was
of the view that these windfall gains can then be
used to subsidise the higher cost coal-fired Van Eck
power station and the Paratus diesel power plant. In
recent years, primary energy costs have risen signif-
icantly (e.g. NamPower coal costs rose 378%
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between 2003 and 2008 – Figure 7) and the import
parity derived average generation price has been
insufficient to meet the cost of increased generation
at Nampower’s two thermal plants. As a result, the
ECB has suspended the import parity regime and
instead takes into account actual fuel costs. In future
it is intended that the Revenue Requirement
approach, which is already in use for transmission
and distribution, shall be adopted for the generation
sector.
Figure 7: NamPower coal cost
Cost reflectivity
Theoretically the Revenue Requirement calculation
– based on rate of return on assets plus depreciation
and operating and maintenance costs, allows for full
cost recovery. However, this has yet to be achieved.
The Namibian government has a stated objective of
reaching cost reflectivity in bulk tariffs by 2010/11,
but progress has been difficult, mainly because of
the increase in fuel prices (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Path to cost reflectivity (N$)
Source: Electricity Control Board 
Although tariffs are yet to reach cost reflective
levels, it is commendable that over the period 2002
to 2007, NamPower’s average price had not been
eroded by inflation and had in fact risen in real
terms, as shown in Table 1. The effect of this is that
consumers will be shielded from excessive tariff
increases as the government’s policy of cost reflec-
tivity is implemented.
Asset valuation
A progressive feature of the economic regulatory
methodology employed in Namibia, is its use of
current or replacement asset values when determin-
ing the rate of return in its revenue requirement cal-
culation. Most countries in the region rely on histor-
ical, depreciated asset values. In conte
xts of high inflation, with long intervals between
investments, this can lead to average prices well
below those required to support new investment.
Namibia’s use of replacement values, implies that
prices will rise to close to long-term marginal costs
and hence be at levels sufficient to attract new IPP
investments.
Efficiency incentives
One of the disadvantages of rate-of-return, or
cost-of-service regulation is that it provides few
incentives for operators to reduce costs (see Averch
and Johnson (1962)). The ECB was aware of this
deficiency and for the distribution sector has
capped non-technical losses at a stringent 1.25% of
total revenue, or at the level for the previous year
whichever was lower. For technical losses these
were capped in a range of 10 – 15% depending on
nature and location of the particular distributor. The
ECB did however treat requested maintenance
expenses favourably during tariff revisions.
It is also noteworthy that for a country with a
population of just over 2 million, the ECB approves
32 distribution tariffs of varying structures. This
places an inordinate amount of work on the regula-
tor and also presents a challenge for performance
monitoring and benchmarking. This challenge is
not eased by the distortionary impact of the discre-
tionary local authority surcharge, which varied from
N¢9.19/kWh to N¢56.98/kWh in 2007/08 across
the fourteen municipalities that apply it as shown in
Figure 9.
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Table 1: NamPower average price
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Average price per unit (N$-cents/kWh) 21.56 27.63 30.11 33.77 34.71 38.38
Average price per unit (US$-cents/kWh) 2.05 3.67 4.67 5.27 5.04 5.34
Average annual price increase (%) n/a 28.2 9.0 12.2 2.8 10.6
Average annual  inflation (%) 11.4 7.1 4.2 2.3 5.1 6.7
Figure 9: Local authority surcharge (N¢/kWh)
4.3.2 Adequacy and security of supply and the
attraction of new investment
Although the number of consumer groups met in
Namibia was by no means representative, there was
general contentment with the existing level of elec-
tricity quality and reliability. However, future relia-
bility of electricity supplies was at risk since the
biggest concern for Namibia remained the looming
shortages of electricity supplies as a result of the
reduced availability of electricity imports, the
absence of IPP investments, increased economic
activity and the forecast demand for electricity in
the country. 
The peer review made five recommendations
aimed at enhancing security and reliability of sup-
ply. Firstly, it was noteworthy that there was no elec-
tricity security supply standard for Namibia. Such a
standard if based on an agreed Loss of Load
Expectation (LOLE) could introduce more objectiv-
ity in the determination of the country’s reserve
margin, import requirements and the opportune
time at which to increase generation and transmis-
sion capacities. Secondly, responsibility for moni-
toring and reporting on this security standard need-
ed to be allocated to the regulator. Thirdly, there
appeared to be uncertainty on where the responsi-
bility for the National Integrated Resource Plan
(NIRP) lay. During the peer review it was found that
while NamPower was undertaking an NIRP, this
process had not been recognised by the ECB who
intended to undertake a separate planning process.
Clearly such duplication was not the most optimum
use of otherwise scarce resources. With the atten-
dant need of attracting new generation into the sec-
tor, clarification of this responsibility would only aid
the process. Lastly, it was noted that most expres-
sions of interest in new build opportunities that
were received were unsolicited. 
The peer review recommended that internation-
al competitive bedding processes be initiated in
time to meet the supply requirement indicated in
the NIRP. Criteria and processes also needed to be
developed for assessing unsolicited bids. 
4.3.3 Financial viability of utilities
NamPower, the state owned vertically integrated
utility and dominant player in Namibia’s electricity
industry remains a financially viable entity and has
been profitable over the last 10 years (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: NamPower financial performance
This is in part due to the ECB’s commitment to
cost reflectivity. More recently, government’s
N$1Billion recapitalisation programme (N$250 mil-
lion in 2007 and 2008 respectively with the balance
expected in 2009) has significantly aided
NamPower’s financial health. In addition, govern-
ment has approved an annual grant of N$120mil-
lion to support the running of expensive thermal
generation to ensure security of supply over the
period 2008 to 2010. Consequently, on account of
these and other factors such as Namibia’s (the
country) own sovereign rating, rating company
Fitch in March 2009 reaffirmed NamPower’s BBB-
investment-grade rating. Interestingly, in its assess-
ment of NamPower’s operating environment the
rating agency makes the following comment: ‘The
regulator continues to make progress towards bring-
ing regulation more into line with developed market
standards’ (Fitch, 2009).
In the distribution sector however, challenges
remain. A 2006 benchmarking exercise revealed
that all the REDs had failed to perform satisfactori-
ly against set benchmarks, with the best performing
having only been satisfactory in three of the speci-
fied nine specified performance measures shown in
Table 2. In interviews with the Chief Executive
Officers of two of the REDs, it was revealed that at
current tariff levels there was insufficient revenue
being generated to earn an adequate rate of return
or to fund the depreciation expense. While no evi-
dence was presented to support this assertion, the
ECB’s own admission that tariffs were at below cost
levels lent it credence. It would however, appear
that there was also need for internal efficiency
improvements within REDs to lower costs.
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Table 2: Key performance indicators
Performance indicators Benchmark
Financial
Return on revalued assets ≥4%
Operating margin ≥17%
Current ratio
Quick ratio 
Liquidity ≥1
Technical
Energy conversion efficiency ≥90
Commercial
Debtor days ≤51
Operating cost / sales ≤30%
Bad debts <0.3%
Efficiency
Customers / employee >300
Energy sold / employee ≥6000kWh
Pro-poor initiatives
A special challenge in a country such as Namibia is
the need to widen access to electricity services. For
a country with an overall access rate of 32% of
which rural access was 9.5%, it was surprising that
the regulator did not play an active role in this area.
This could be through tariff structures that target the
poor, incentivising the extension of the grid by util-
ities or encouraging the development of off-grid
electricity supplies for rural communities. 
The peer review found that the only structured
initiative for rural electrification was the annual
grants disbursed to distributors from central govern-
ment, which were in themselves insufficient to meet
the electrification targets set out in the National
Development Plan. Separately, NamPower also
provided a subsidy for rural electrification.
Interestingly, interviews with the ECB revealed that
this subsidy was not recovered in the tariff and that
instead ‘NamPower absorbs any cost mismatches
within itself.’
5. Conclusion
This paper reports on the successful application of
the regulatory evaluation framework developed by
Brown et al., (2006). Peer reviews provide an effec-
tive means for undertaking such evaluations as well
as affording unique experiential learning to the peer
review participants as they compare and share
knowledge and practices in the country being
reviewed with their own country contexts. 
Effective regulation should lead to cost-effective
tariffs, reliable and quality infrastructure service,
financial viability of utilities and the attraction of
new investments. We find that in the case of
Namibia, the regulatory system has encouraged
cost effective pricing, although full cost reflectivity is
yet to be reached. The pricing regime for generation
could be made more efficient and distribution tariffs
streamlined. The financial viability of the distribu-
tion sector and the attraction of new generation
investment do however, present challenges for the
long term sustainability and quality of electricity
supplies.
Notes
1. 2001 figures, source Electricity Control Board,
Namibia.
2. Source NamPower Annual reports – includes the
Scorpion mine which is supplied from the South
African grid.
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